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A Sticky Trait: Social Trust among Swedish Expatriates in Countries with Varying Institutional Quality

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Abstract

Social trust is linked to many desirable economic and social outcomes. Using new data from a representative sample of 2,668 Swedish expatriates, we examine the robustness of high social trust in countries with different levels of institutional quality. The results suggest that individual trust decreases with length of stay in countries with high corruption and low rule of law. The effect is relatively small and driven by expatriates who were aged 30 years or below upon arrival to the new country. While other studies have found that trust among migrants adapts to destination country trust levels, we find that after the (approximate) age of 30, high trust is a sticky personality trait. The results are robust to controlling for a large array of individual characteristics (including age) and support the view that social trust is sensitive to events that occur early in life.

1. Introduction

Social trust is briefly explained as the individual attitude or belief that most people can be trusted. As noted by Arrow (1972), trust is a crucial element in most economic transactions, and more recent research has confirmed its empirical relevance. On the country level, average trust can explain for example economic growth (Algan and Cahuc, 2010), macroeconomic stability (Sangnier, 2013) and welfare state size (Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011; Bjørnskov and Svendsen, 2013). On an individual level, trust is positively linked to prosocial behavior (Sønderskov, 2011), to self-assessed health (Ljunge, 2014a), to happiness (Bjørnskov, 2003) and to personal income (Butler et al., 2016). Social trust is also one of the most important components of social capital, which typically also includes norms of reciprocity and networks (Putnam, 1993; Hooghe and Stolle, 2003).

Given the documented importance of trust, it is natural to ask where trust comes from and how robust it is. This paper studies the robustness of high social trust in institutional settings that are believed to be detrimental for trust. We do so by analyzing social trust among 2,668 Swedish expatriates that have spent varying lengths of time in countries with more corruption and less rule of law than Sweden. Our results suggest that high social trust is a highly persistent attitude, but for those who migrated to countries with inferior institutions at age 30 or less, we find a negative association between trust and length of stay in the new country, whereas no such pattern appears in countries with better institutions (as measured by indicators of corruption and rule of law).

Our findings contribute to a literature that examines the creation and destruction of trusting attitudes, surveyed for example by Dinesen and Sønderskov (2018a, b) and Hooghe and Stolle (2003). Hooghe and Stolle (2003) distinguish between society-centered and institution-centered approaches to explaining trusting attitudes. The former see the trusting attitude as being linked to and influenced by social interactions and the latter see trust as embedded in and shaped by policies and political institutions. In particular, rule of law and absence of corruption have been argued to be conducive for trust. For example, Berggren and Jordahl (2006:148) note that “developing trust in [others], hinges on being able to rely on a fair and effective system of protective government. “

Importantly, the literature suggests that both institutions and social interactions matter. For example, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) show that current differences in trust levels in Africa can be traced

back to the slave trades – arguably a result of inferior rule of law – with effects that have been transmitted over generations through norms, beliefs, and values. Uslander (2002) uses a simultaneous equation approach and country level data to argue that the effect of corruption on trust is greater than the opposite causal claim, but also that trust must be increased to reduce corruption.

Several studies use migration to study the stability and adaptability of trust. By studying second-generation immigrants across Europe, Ljunge (2014c) shows that immigrants whose father was born in a more democratic country are more trusting than those who have fathers from less democratic countries. Moschion and Tabasso (2014) study social trust among second-generation immigrants in Australia and in the United States, and conclude that both home and host countries matter (with home country trust being marginally more important in the United States). Ljunge (2014b) studies second-generation immigrants in 29 European countries with ancestry in 87 different nations, and concludes that the influence from average trust in the parents' country is significant and comparable to an increase in income from the bottom to the top three deciles of the income distribution. In Ljunge's study, parental transmission of trust is especially strong on the mother's side.

Dinesen (2012) examines first-generation immigrants to Northern Europe from the low-trust countries Turkey, Poland, and Italy. Using a matching procedure that compares migrants to similar individuals in the home country, Dinesen concludes that destination-country context has "a massive impact" (p. 495) on the trust of immigrants. Similar results appear in Nannestad et al. (2014) for migrants to Denmark from Turkey, Pakistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro. It bears noting, however, that while Turks in Denmark are more trusting than their matched counterparts in Turkey, they are still far from the high trust levels of native Danes.

The institution-centered approach includes cross-country studies such as Knack and Zak (2003) who argue that strengthening the rule of law will increase trust, and Berggren and Jordahl (2006) that examine the role of economic freedom in explaining trust. Other methods include Rothstein and Eek (2009) who argue, using a hypothetical choice experiment, that perceived corruption affects social trust, and Kumlin and Rothstein (2005) who rely on survey data within Sweden to argue that welfare state universality causes trust.

To summarize the literature, it seems clear that both society-centered and institution-centered approaches have some merit, and several questions deserve further analysis. We contribute by analyzing if the high trust of Swedes is robust to living in countries with inferior institutions. Our approach improves on existing research in several ways. In cross-country regressions (Uslaner 2002, Knack and Zak 2003, Berggren and Jordahl 2006), good instruments for institutions are hard to find. Hypothetical choice experiments (Rothstein and Eek 2009) and surveys within one country (Kumlin and Rothstein 2005) can be questioned with respect to external validity. The results in papers that study immigration to high-trust countries such as Nannestad et al. (2014) will be biased if migrants are self-selected on traits that are unobservable or not accounted for in the analysis.

Our paper is most closely related to Dinesen (2016) , (2018a) and to Ljunge (2014b). Dinesen showed that Swedish expatriates are more trusting than the Swedish population due to positive self-selection that is tempered by experiences in the new country. Ljunge (2014b) showed (using the European Social Survey) that high trust can persist in low trusting environments through cultural transmission in the family. We expand on these results in several ways: By studying more closely how expatriates are self-selected, by studying the effect of different durations of stay on individual trust in the new countries, by grouping destination countries according to indicators of rule of law and corruption and by examining the importance of the age at the time of arrival to the new country. Compared to Ljunge (2014b) we also contribute by studying a larger set of destination countries, thus including more countries with inferior institutions. By having more fine-grained data on length of stay, we also contribute to the literature on change and stability in attitudes over the life cycle, a literature that dates back to Inglehart (1977) and Newcomb (1967). As noted by Stoker and Jennings (2008), the idea that openness to change declines with age is commonly accepted despite having only limited empirical support.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, we present the data and our empirical strategy. The third section consists of analyses of trust among Swedish expatriates residing in countries with different levels of institutional quality. In the fourth and concluding section, we summarize and discuss the implications of our findings.

2. Data and empirical strategy

The exact number of Swedish expatriates is unknown. Estimates vary between 250,000 and 660,000, partly depending on definition (Solevid, 2016). In February 2014, 256,180 migrants from Sweden were registered by the Swedish Tax authority. This is the most credible source regarding Swedish expatriates (Solevid, 2016), and it includes those who have reported to the Tax authority that they will move to another country and stay there for at least one year. Some people might leave the country without reporting to the authorities, but the high taxes in Sweden create a strong incentive for informing the Tax authority about emigration. Using the tax register of Swedish expatriates as a frame, the SOM Institute in Sweden conducted a representative survey of Swedish expatriates in 2014 (persons without a valid postal address were excluded; see Vernersdotter 2016 for details about the survey). It is the first survey of its kind and covers Swedish citizens aged 18-75 years who deregistered from the Swedish Tax Authority population register due to moving abroad. Those in the sample were contacted by postal mail and invited to fill out a web-based questionnaire that was open from 27 September 2014 to 30 January 2015. The survey consisted of a wide range of questions, including questions on social trust and a number of individual characteristics.¹ 2,668 expatriates answered the survey, which corresponds to a response rate of 27 percent. A low response rate was expected since this is a population that is hard to reach with addresses that are likely to be outdated, but the age and gender distributions of respondents are representative (Vernersdotter, 2016). Still, unless stated otherwise, the estimates presented here are calculated using weights that account for survey design and nonresponses within country groups.

Among the respondents, 57 percent (unweighted) reside in the 12 most common countries that are listed in Table 1, with the remaining 43 percent being scattered across 98 other different countries,

¹ Data are available through Swedish National Data Service.

resulting in a sample of 110 countries at most. 22 percent of the respondents have resided in two countries since migrating from Sweden and an additional 15 percent have resided in three or more countries. Our baseline includes respondents who have resided in more than one country, provided that more than half of the total time abroad has been in the country in which they are currently residing, resulting in a sample of 2,092 respondents. As a robustness test, we have verified that the results hold also when limiting the sample to those who have only resided in one country except Sweden (n=1,673).


To compare the Swedish expatriates to Swedes residing in Sweden, we use the SOM institute's 2014 national survey (Oscarsson, 2016), which has 5,835 respondents between 18 and 75 years of age. There are many different reasons for emigrating from Sweden, the most common three being work in another country, moving to a spouse or family and accompanying spouse/family who have moved. As will be shown, there are only small differences in trust among migrants to different types of destination countries.

Table 1. Most common residence countries of Swedish expatriates

	Share of respondents	Share of emigrants 2014
Norway	9	11.4
USA	9	6.3
UK	8	7.1
Germany	5	4.8
Switzerland	5	1.3
Denmark	4	8.2
France	4	1.7
Spain	3	2.4
Finland	3	5.1
Thailand	3	1.4
Australia	2	1.9
Brazil	2	0.4

Source: The SOM Institute's Swedish Expatriate Survey 2014.

Figure 1. Average social trust in Sweden 1982-2014.



Source: The Swedish SOM surveys, available at <https://snd.gu.se/en/catalogue/series/74> and European Values Study (EVS)/World Values Survey (WVS). The latter refer to the percentage who agrees that most people can be trusted (among those who expressed an opinion).

The survey of Swedish expatriates (and Swedes in Sweden) measures social trust on a 0-10 scale, where 10 means that respondent fully agrees that “most people can be trusted“, which is the same phrase as in the international surveys. Importantly, social trust has been remarkably stable over time in Sweden, as indicated by yearly surveys that started in 1996 and according to waves of the World Values Survey/European Values Study from 1982 and onwards (see Figure 1).

Two indicators are used to proxy the quality of institutions: The well-known corruption perception index from Transparency International and the Rule of Law area of the Economic Freedom Index (Gwartney et al., 2015). Both measures are widely used in related literature and have excellent country and year coverage. The correlation between the two measures is 0.83, which is high but still lower than the correlation between several other rule of law indicators (see Versteeg and Ginsburg

2017 for a survey and analysis). We view the measures as two different workable proxies for the same underlying concept known as institutional quality, legal integrity or rule of law. By using two different measures we lower the risk of finding results that are driven by the specific choice of institutional indicators. We acknowledge that institutional quality is hard to measure precisely and also correlated with other country level characteristics, including trust, economic freedom, democracy and quality of government (Bjørnskov, 2007; Graeff and Mehlkop, 2003; Uslaner 2003, La Porta et al., 1999). We do not aim to distinguish between effects of different types of institutional quality, but in order to facilitate comparisons with previous findings (e.g. Berggren and Jordahl, 2006), we present results for all sub-dimensions of the economic freedom index.

The quality of institutions that an individual is exposed to is calculated as follows. Assume that individual i is residing in a new country where she has spent n_i consecutive years. She is observed at t_0 and thus migrated at t_{-n} . The institutional quality (INQ) that i is exposed to is calculated as the weighted mean of the quality of institutions in the new country during her stay:

$$INQ_i = \frac{1}{n_i} \sum_{t=-n}^0 f(t) INQ_t$$

In the expression above, $f(t)$ is a weighting function for which there are no obvious guidelines a priori. One could argue along the lines that first impressions last and assume that $f' > 0$, thus giving more weight to institutions close to the time of arrival. Equally plausible is that memory fades, suggesting $f' < 0$. We therefore opted for the easy and transparent option to set $f \equiv 1$.

When INQ_{-n} is not available (because i has spent more time in the new country than covered by institutional data) we use the closest year available to impute all missing data points. When the

individual has lived in more than one country (except Sweden), we include only those for whom the most recent country of stay accounts for at least 50 percent of total time spent abroad and calculate institutional exposure based on the present country only.

To illustrate our approach, consider Swedish expatriates who have moved to Brazil. They come from one of the least corrupt countries in the world, with a rule of law score between 8 and 9 on the 10 point scale in the economic freedom index, and have lived anywhere from a few years to 30+ years in a country that scores around 5. Brazil is also substantially more corrupt than Sweden (around 40 compared to Sweden's 90 on the Transparency scale from 0 to 100). If living in a country with inferior institutions is detrimental for trust, expatriates who have resided longer in Brazil will be less trusting. If the effect on trust is immediate, due to expectations about the behavior of others in Brazil, recently migrated expatriates will have lower trust than swedes in Sweden and also than migrants to high-trust countries. Theoretically, we might see both an immediate effect (due to expectations) and a continuous effect (due to experiences).

We first examine how trust varies with length of stay in countries with different quality of institutions by interacting length of stay with the institutional indicator and calculating predicted trust levels (see Brambor et al, 2006 for a technical yet accessible description of how to interpret interactions in settings like this one). The interaction-approach is however restrictive in that it implicitly assumes a linear relationship between trust, institutions and length of stay. We therefore continue by dividing the sample into three categories based on the quality of institutions (worst, medium and best) and run separate regressions for each category including indicator variables that correspond to varying lengths of stay. Compared to a standard model where length of stay is interacted with institutional quality, dividing the sample is both less restrictive and more informative. The downside is that

estimates become less precise as the sample is divided multiple times. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std.dev.	Min	Max
<i>Institutional quality</i>					
Corruption perception index	89	50.21	19.34	16	92
Rule of law	79	6.278	1.829	1.463	9.124
Economic freedom	79	7.072	0.790	3.791	8.631
Regulation	79	6.887	0.884	4.204	8.690
Sound money	79	8.648	1.153	4.724	9.887
Size of government	79	6.274	1.343	3.626	8.828
Freedom to trade	79	7.267	1.116	3.408	9.194
<i>Other country level variables</i>					
Gini	90	37.97	9.080	22.64	59.40
Trust	93	25.30	13.24	5,774	68.08
<i>Individual characteristics</i>					
Age	2,092	49.05	14.85	18	75
Female	2,092	0.501		0	1
Non-European parent	1,862	0.153		0	1
High education	1,937	0.684		0	1
Migrated for job	2,092	0.357		0	1
Religious	1,868	0.404		0	1
Married	1,943	0.801		0	1
Employed	1,910	0.627		0	1
Unemployed	1,910	0.042		0	1
Retired	1,910	0.233		0	1
Health status (subjective)	1,942	8.136	1.778	0	10
Social trust	1,952	7.132	2.047	0	10

Comment: Unweighted estimates. For additional information about the variables, see Table 3 and Table A8 (in the appendix). Country level variables refer to most recent available year.

The biggest challenge for our empirical strategy is that the selection of emigrants to destination countries is not random. If there is selection on observable characteristics, we should see that the trust levels of expatriates in different types of countries vary substantially, and that there are large differences in unconditional trust and trust conditional on individual characteristics. A second caveat

concerns selection on unobservables; if there is selection on traits that matter for trust but are not captured by individual controls, the effect of institutions on trust can still be assessed by comparing those who have had long exposure to those who have had short exposure, assuming that these groups are comparable. The fact that there are no sudden spikes in emigration from Sweden and that the reasons for emigrating has not changed much over time suggest that selection in emigration has been roughly constant over time. It is also possible, however, that some expatriates are more likely to migrate from the new country (back to Sweden or somewhere else). If those with lower trust are more likely to stay, a negative association between trust and length of stay would be a selection effect rather than a causal effect of experiences in the new country. In the next section we first examine these selection effects, before analyzing the relationship between trust, institutional quality and length of stay.

3. Empirical analysis and results

To examine how newly arrived expatriates differ from the Swedish population with respect to trust, we combine survey data regarding both Swedes living in Sweden and Swedish expatriates who have resided less than two years in the new country. Trust is then regressed on personal characteristics, including a dummy variable for expats. With a two-year limit, there are plenty of observations while keeping the influence of experiences in the new country to a minimum.

As shown in Table 3, expatriates who have recently migrated are on average somewhat more trusting than the Swedish population (6.97 compared to 6.65 on the 0-10 scale, but the difference is only significant at the .10 level). The difference decreases only marginally when controlling for education, age, gender, having at least one parent born outside of Europe, civil status, employment status, retirement and self-placement on the political left-right scale – suggesting that matching migrants with non-migrants based on these criteria will not necessarily create a comparable control group.

Table 3. Explaining social trust using individual characteristics

Variables	Model			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Recent expatriate	0.32* (0.17)	0.29* (0.18)	0.06 (0.16)	-0.08 (0.18)
High education		0.77*** (0.07)	0.65*** (0.06)	0.61*** (0.11)
Age/10		0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)
Age squared		0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Female		0.13* (0.07)	0.19*** (0.06)	0.18 (0.11)
Non-European parent		-1.16*** (0.21)	-1.13*** (0.20)	-1.08*** (0.36)
Married		0.45*** (0.08)	0.34*** (0.08)	0.14 (0.14)
Employed		0.33** (0.14)	-0.04 (0.13)	-0.16 (0.23)
Unemployed		-0.55** (0.23)	-0.60*** (0.22)	-0.86** (0.39)
Retired		-0.13 (0.18)	-0.36** (0.17)	-0.39 (0.30)
Left-right position		-0.01 (0.03)	-0.07*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.05)
Health status			0.31*** (0.02)	0.29*** (0.03)
Religious				-0.13 (0.11)
Constant	6.65*** (0.03)	5.46*** (0.39)	3.24*** (0.39)	2.44*** (0.68)
Observations	4,602	4,073	4,055	1,367
R ²	0.00	0.08	0.16	0.15

Comment: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, standard errors in parentheses. Information on expatriates comes from the SOM Institute's Swedish Expatriate Survey 2014 (restricted to Swedish expatriates who migrated in the last two years) and information on Swedes in Sweden comes from the SOM Institute's National Survey 2014, both referring to the age group 18-75. All variables are based on survey responses. The dependent variable is Trust measured on a 0-10 scale, where higher values refer to higher trust. 'Non-European parent' is based on a survey question whether the respondent had at least one parent who grew up somewhere outside of Europe. Married includes cohabitees. Left-right position is measured on a 5-point scale, where higher values mean further to the right. Health status is measured on a 0-10 scale, where higher values indicate better health. Religious refers to the answer Yes to the question "Do you believe in God?" (this question is only posed to a subsample in the national survey, therefore the number of respondents is substantially lower when it is included in the model).

When controlling also for subjective health, recent expatriates are no longer significantly more trusting. These results suggest that expatriates are more trusting mainly because they have better subjective health. In a fourth model, we also control for religiousness, but there is still no difference

in trust between Swedish expatriates and Swedes residing in Sweden.² The control variables in general have the expected sign. Having at least one parent who grew up outside of Europe lowers matters a lot and on average lowers trust by over one point on the 0-10 scale, confirming the findings by Ljunge (2014b, c).

3.1 Selection effects

Does trust among recently migrated vary with institutional quality in their new country? If it does, it can be the result of either self-selection or of a rapid adjustment to living in another type of country. As mentioned previously, we divide migrants in our sample into tertiles depending on perceived corruption levels and the rule of law indicator in the economic freedom index. Table 4 shows the average trust for recent migrants to countries with low, medium and high levels of corruption and rule of law, sorted from ‘worst’ to ‘best’ institutions, with and without controlling for individual characteristics.

If anything, there is a weak tendency for migrants to countries in the medium category to be slightly less trusting, but the differences are not significant. In the best and worst categories, trust is very close to seven on the 0-10 scale. A more detailed comparison is provided in Table A8a in the appendix. Compared to the best countries, migrants to the worst countries are more likely to have a non-European parent, less likely to migrate for a job, and higher fractions are unemployed or retired (in particular among recent migrants). In section 3.3 we report results from excluding retirees and excluding migration to Thailand (which is a very popular vacation destination in Sweden and might possibly affect results).

² The number of observations decreases substantially when adding religiousness since that question was only posed to a subsample in the national survey.

Table 4. Average trust (unconditional and conditional on individual characteristics) among recent migrants to countries with different institutional quality

Institutional quality	Corruption		Rule of law	
	Uncond.	Cond.	Uncond.	Cond.
Worst	7.28 (0.24)	7.25 (0.33)	7.19 (0.26)	7.13 (0.38)
Medium	6.94 (0.26)	6.78 (0.28)	6.87 (0.28)	6.58 (0.26)
Best	6.90 (0.28)	6.96 (0.23)	6.95 (0.27)	7.06 (0.25)
Observations	210	188	209	187

Comment: The estimates refer to the average trust among Swedish expatriates who migrated in the last two years, divided into thirds depending of their new country's institutional characteristics (the variables considered separately, standard errors within parentheses). Corruption is based on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index and the average score among the respondents for each the three groups are 45, 71 and 87. Rule of law refers to Fraser Institute's Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights Index where the average levels of the three groups are 5.8, 7.6 and 8.7. The estimates conditional on individual characteristics include all covariates in Table 3 and also a variable referring to if the reason for migrating was work. Source: the SOM Institute's Swedish Expatriate Survey 2014; the Quality of Government standard dataset, January 2017 version (Teorell et al. 2016).

Another possible selection effect is related to duration, in the sense that some traits may be associated with the probability of staying in the new country. If those with lower trust are more likely to stay, a negative association between trust and length of stay may be a selection effect rather than a causal effect of experiences in the new country. As it turns out, answers to a survey question on the intention to stay in the new country indicate that in highly corrupt countries, (conditional) trust is significantly higher among those who intend to stay than for those who intend to move (see Table A9 in the appendix). That pattern suggests that our finding that trust is lower for those with longer durations is not driven by more trusting deciding to move from the new country (if anything, it suggests we underestimate the impact on trust or that the question). For the rule of law indicator, there are no significant associations between trust and stated intentions to stay. To further examine how comparable recent migrants are to those with more years in the new country, table A8a in the appendix shows descriptive statistics for expatriates who recently arrived versus expatriates with 20 or more years in the new country. In the most corrupt countries, the two groups are surprisingly

similar. It is worth noting that the age difference between recent and longstanding migrants in the worst countries is small (7 years), especially compared to the 23 year difference in the best countries. The two biggest differences are that among those with 20+ years in the new country, there are more women (59%) and religiosity is higher (49%) than among recently arrived (41% and 31% respectively).

3.2 Trust, institutional quality and length of stay


Running a standard OLS model with interaction-effects between institutional quality and length of stay (following Brambor et al, 2006) allows us to calculate expected trust levels of expatriates depending on institutional quality and length of stay in the new country (Table A3 shows regression output). The results are illustrated in Figure 2.

The results are in line with institution-centered approach: Time spent in the new country associates positively with trust in countries where institutional quality is high, but negatively in countries where institutional quality is low. Similar results are found for corruption and rule of law.


Because the interaction model forces a lot of structure on the data, we now turn to our more flexible main specification. We divide destination countries into thirds based on the institutional indicators, and run separate regressions explaining trust using individual characteristics and dummy variables that indicate different lengths of stay. Country fixed effects are included to control for country level heterogeneity (though excluding these only marginally affects results). The results regarding length of stay and trust in countries with different institutional quality are illustrated in Figure 3 (coefficients and estimated levels of trust are also shown in Table A4 and A5 in the Appendix).

Figure 2. Trust and length of length of stay in countries with different institutional quality (linear interaction model)

a. Corruption




b. Rule of law



Comment: The figure illustrates predicted levels of trust at different levels of corruption (higher values means less corruption) and rule of law (higher values is better) and different lengths of time in the new country with associated confidence intervals. See Table A3 in the Appendix for the full regression model and additional information about the variables.

The results from the model with sample splits are in line with the interaction model. As expected, splitting the sample leads to less precisely estimated levels of trust, but it is also worth noting that the differences in trust are now also smaller compared to the interaction model, both over time and across country groups.

Figure 3. Trust and length of stay in destination countries with different institutional quality (model with sample splits).



Comment: All time intervals include at least 200 individuals. Individual controls included. See Table A4 in the Appendix for additional information.

Still, trust among those who have lived 30 years or more in a highly corrupt country is significantly lower than the trust among those who only recently migrated to a corrupt country, and it is also significantly lower than the trust level among those who have lived 30 years or more in a relatively low-corrupt country. That is a long time in a new country. However, even if the differences are not significant, Figure 3 suggests that it might not take so many years. If we use broader time categories, we indeed find that expatriates who have lived between 6 and 20 years in a highly corrupt country

have lower trust level than those who have lived a shorter time in such a country (see Figure A3 in the Appendix). The same patterns hold when we use rule of law as our measure of institutional quality.


The average decline in trust with the length of stay in countries with inferior institutions masks an interesting heterogeneity, illustrated in Figure 4. Splitting the sample once more into those who were older than 30 at the time of migration and those who were at most 30 years of age, reveals that the differences in trust comes from the latter group.³ Young emigrants from Sweden are highly trusting initially regardless of where they have moved, (typically being close to 8 on the 0-10 scale), but in countries with inferior institutions, trust declines with length of stay.

The effect is relatively small: After several decades in the most corrupt countries, social trust is still very close to the high trust level of Swedes in Sweden (which is around 6.6 on the 0-10 scale). In contrast, for those who were older than 30 at the age of emigration, trust seems to be completely independent of length stay, even in the countries with the worst institutional quality. These findings support the impressionable years hypothesis that individuals are highly susceptible to attitude change during late adolescence and early adulthood, but not later in life (Greenstein, 1965; Krosnick and Alwin, 1989).


³ Some individuals in the sample have lived in their current country during different, separate time periods. For those individuals it is not possible to extract information from the survey data about their age when they moved their current country, so they have been excluded from this part of the analyses. They constitute, however, only about 5 per cent of the observations.

Figure 4. Trust and length of stay in countries with different institutional quality depending on age at arrival (cut-offs ≤ 30 , >30)

a. Corruption



b. Rule of law



Comment: Individual controls included. See Table [A4](#) in the Appendix for additional information.

3.3 Robustness tests and extensions

To verify the robustness of our results, and to examine potential mechanisms that may explain the main results as illustrated in Figure 3, we have conducted a large set of additional analyses. Omitting country fixed effects does not alter the main findings. Omitting the potentially endogenous control variables education, marriage status, employment status, religion and health status, generates results shown in Table A4 in the Appendix. The fact that these results are very similar to the baseline findings, suggest that these control variables are not important mechanisms in the relationship between institutions and trust. We have also included country level Gini coefficients for disposable income (from Solt, 2009) as a control variable in models without country fixed effects. Doing so confirms the negative association between inequality and trust noted by many others (see Jordahl 2008), but the pattern regarding institutions and trust is unaffected (results are shown in Table A7, cf. Table A6, and figure A1 in the appendix).

To further examine potential mechanisms in how trust changes, we have divided the sample into respondents with and without regular contact with authorities. The results, shown in Figure A2, show that trust does not fall with length of stay for those who regularly have such contacts. This supports the findings reported by Schlösser, et al., 2016 and Dunning and Fetchenhauer, 2010, that high trust (at least for some) is virtue driven by emotions, rather than a result of experiences or rational expectations.

To test the robustness of our results regarding the impressionable years hypothesis, we first change the cutoff from 30 years of age to 35. Setting the cutoff at 35 rather than 30 years of age produces similar results. Lowering the cutoff to 25 makes the older group look more like the younger, and also results in imprecise estimates for the younger group due to a small sample. A second robustness test

is to run the main analysis without those who have resided in another country outside Sweden before moving to their present country. Again, results remain very similar. We have also tried changing the granularity of the time dimension in our analysis, in the sense of having more or fewer time dummies. These results are shown in Figure A3 in the Appendix. Excluding countries with 10 or fewer respondents removes many of the most corrupt countries in the sample but still generates the same patterns (results shown in Table A5).

The tables A3 to A6 in the Appendix present estimated levels of trust and include all areas of the economic freedom index. These results confirm the findings in Berggren and Jordahl (2006) that economic freedom matters for trust, in particular freedom to trade (EFW4) and regulatory freedom (EFW5). Monetary stability (EFW3) does not matter much at all, and the effect of size of government (EFW1) is if anything the opposite. Considering that low economic freedom means large government size, which is positively correlated with trust (Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011), the finding is less surprising.

Table A10 to A12 show results with retirees excluded, with respondents age 60+ excluded, and with residents in Thailand excluded. Figure A4 to A6 illustrate the results graphically. We do this because emigration to Thailand and/or migrating to a warmer country when retired might be different decision compared to other reasons for leaving Sweden. In all cases, the main results are confirmed: Only among those who have lived a long time in the worst countries do we find (slightly) lower trust levels.

Finally, survey answers regarding trust should always be interpreted with special care. If those who answer the survey are more trusting, results will be biased towards finding no detrimental effect of institutions on trust. On the other hand, if such effects are substantial, there would be much fewer

responses from those who have lived long in the worst countries, which is not the case. That type of biased nonresponse pattern is also highly unlikely to explain the importance of age at arrival.

4. Concluding discussion

We have analyzed survey measured trust levels of Swedish expatriates and examined how it varies with institutional quality and length of time spent in the new country. Controlling for a large set of individual characteristics, the longer expatriates have lived in countries with low institutional quality, the lower is their average trust level. For a given time spent in the new country, trust is also lower in countries where institutions are worse. These results hold both when institutional quality is proxied by Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, and by the rule of law indicator in the Fraser Institute's index of economic freedom.

Our main findings are clearly in line with expectations based on institution-centered approaches to explaining trust. We have also shown, however, that these results are entirely driven by expatriates who came to the new country when they were at most 30 years of age. For those who were older than 30 at the time of emigration, trust is remarkable independent of both time spent in the new country and institutional quality. These results suggest that high trust is a sticky personality trait, and they strengthen previous results in Ljunge (2014b) that high trust can be persistent also in low trust environments. Our findings are also in line with the impressionable years hypothesis in psychological research.

It bears noting that among young emigrants to countries with inferior institutions, trust is initially very high, and even after more than 30 years in another country, these migrants are roughly as trusting as Swedes in Sweden. These expatriates left Sweden when they were relatively young, and

the fact that they have trust levels typical for Sweden even after living most of their adult life in a country with much lower institutional quality, can be interpreted as supporting a cultural explanation of trust. It should be noted, however, that people in general exhibit strong homophily in race and ethnicity (McPherson et al., 2001). As a result, Swedish expatriates can be expected to socialize with people who are similar in these dimensions, and to live lives that at least partially shield them against the adverse consequences of inferior institutions. Nevertheless, studies that document how expatriates experience their new country, suggest some pathways that could potentially influence social trust. For example, Wästerfors (2001) describe how Swedish expatriates in Poland often remember details and first impressions such as the quality of roads and buildings. Greppin et al (2017) show that U.S. Executive Expatriates who work in highly corrupt countries, must face difficult choices regarding whether to refuse to participate in corrupt practices, or to do so (willingly or reluctantly).

To fully understand how institutions shape attitudes such as social trust, it is probably fruitful to combine quantitative analysis with qualitative evidence and case studies, and also to examine more closely if there are individual traits that are associated with the stability of trust.

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Table A1. Explaining trust using individual characteristics and length of stay in countries with different institutional quality. OLS regression models

VARIABLES	CPI	EFW2	EFW	EFW5	EFW3	EFW1	EFW4
Age (10s)	0.698*** (0.233)	0.560** (0.252)	0.630** (0.240)	0.577** (0.252)	0.576** (0.249)	0.764*** (0.249)	0.582** (0.254)
Age squared	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Female	0.178* (0.106)	0.242** (0.102)	0.179* (0.105)	0.246** (0.103)	0.230** (0.101)	0.162 (0.117)	0.211* (0.111)
Non-European Parent	-0.671*** (0.209)	-0.947*** (0.233)	-0.724*** (0.228)	-0.970*** (0.229)	-0.910*** (0.240)	-0.832*** (0.209)	-0.917*** (0.231)
High education	0.293* (0.160)	0.286* (0.165)	0.293* (0.162)	0.288* (0.164)	0.282* (0.166)	0.310* (0.173)	0.294* (0.163)
Religious	-0.058 (0.088)	-0.077 (0.091)	-0.064 (0.087)	-0.067 (0.092)	-0.089 (0.092)	-0.088 (0.093)	-0.081 (0.090)
Married	-0.150 (0.093)	-0.182* (0.097)	-0.159* (0.095)	-0.181* (0.096)	-0.171* (0.096)	-0.152 (0.098)	-0.174* (0.097)
Employed	-0.341*** (0.127)	-0.278** (0.116)	-0.335*** (0.127)	-0.282** (0.117)	-0.283** (0.116)	-0.320** (0.125)	-0.283** (0.118)
Unemployed	-0.391 (0.324)	-0.394 (0.320)	-0.400 (0.328)	-0.395 (0.325)	-0.407 (0.321)	-0.400 (0.325)	-0.402 (0.318)
Retired	-0.470*** (0.165)	-0.487*** (0.166)	-0.488*** (0.159)	-0.467*** (0.166)	-0.496*** (0.168)	-0.491*** (0.162)	-0.501*** (0.167)
Health status	0.228*** (0.035)	0.224*** (0.034)	0.227*** (0.035)	0.222*** (0.036)	0.226*** (0.033)	0.234*** (0.034)	0.225*** (0.035)
Migrated for job	-0.130 (0.103)	-0.052 (0.115)	-0.119 (0.104)	-0.049 (0.113)	-0.059 (0.116)	-0.099 (0.106)	-0.064 (0.118)
Years abroad (10s)	-0.156 (0.114)	-0.596 (0.410)	-0.318 (0.211)	-0.574** (0.268)	-0.087 (0.351)	-0.024 (0.111)	-0.608** (0.305)
[Institutional quality, see column head]	0.020*** (0.005)	-0.034 (0.212)	0.216*** (0.070)	-0.083 (0.167)	0.166 (0.133)	-0.224*** (0.049)	0.016 (0.196)
Interaction Years abroad (10s)* [Institutional quality, see column head]	0.002 (0.001)	0.080 (0.053)	0.040 (0.026)	0.082** (0.036)	0.011 (0.037)	0.003 (0.020)	0.075** (0.038)
Constant	1.995*** (0.578)	4.111*** (1.451)	1.937*** (0.605)	4.446*** (1.071)	2.233 (1.382)	4.661*** (0.687)	3.722*** (1.351)

Observations	1,691	1,665	1,665	1,665	1,665	1,665	1,665
R-squared	0.126	0.095	0.114	0.097	0.096	0.107	0.096

Comments: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered within countries). The individual characteristics are based on survey responses among Swedish expatriates, restricted to those who have lived at least half of their time abroad in the country where they currently are residing, see comments to Table 2 for additional information. The institutional qualities refer to country characteristics: Corruption refers to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (scale 0-100, where higher values mean lower corruption). The six different measures of economic freedom come from the Fraser Institute (EFW=Economic Freedom Index, EFW2=Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights, EFW5=Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business, EFW3=Access to Sound Money, EFW1=Size of Government, EFW4=Freedom to Trade Internationally) and they are all measured on a scale from 0 to 10 (where higher values correspond to more economic freedom, high judicial independence, smaller government, etc.). Source: the SOM Institute's Swedish Expatriate Survey 2014; the Quality of Government standard dataset (January 2017 version).

Table A2. Explaining trust using individual characteristics and length of stay in countries with different institutional quality, divided into tertiles. Coefficients from OLS regression models with country fixed effects

Tertile	Years in new country	CPI	EFW2	EFW	EFW5	EFW3	EFW1	EFW4
Worst or lowest	3-5	0.14	0.28	-0.44	-0.83**	0.14	0.26	0.11
		(0.35)	(0.30)	(0.64)	(0.41)	(0.45)	(0.33)	(0.39)
	6-10	-0.55	-0.39	-0.49	-0.33	-0.24	0.83***	0.12
		(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.29)	(0.50)	(0.16)	(0.52)
	11-15	-0.77***	-0.38	-0.25	-0.80**	-0.65	0.37**	-0.08
		(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.38)	(0.42)	(0.16)	(0.31)
	15-20	-0.42	-0.17	-0.71**	-0.18	0.01	0.63	0.14
		(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.58)
	21-30	-0.81	-0.37	-0.41	-0.45*	-0.75**	0.49***	0.30
		(0.49)	(0.44)	(0.40)	(0.27)	(0.37)	(0.13)	(0.70)
	31+	-0.97***	-0.61*	-0.56	-0.79***	-0.77*	0.46***	-0.61
		(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.28)	(0.46)	(0.12)	(0.58)
Medium	3-5	-0.57	-0.32	0.42*	0.63*	0.55***	-0.38	0.75*
		(0.54)	(0.48)	(0.23)	(0.37)	(0.17)	(0.51)	(0.42)
	6-10	-0.35	-0.19	0.75***	0.33	0.48	-0.53	0.46
		(0.32)	(0.41)	(0.25)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.38)	(0.34)
	11-15	-0.63***	-0.78	0.28	0.16	0.27	-0.41	0.14
		(0.20)	(0.47)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.37)
	15-20	-0.79**	-1.11***	0.89***	0.24	0.43	-0.13	0.13
		(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.25)	(0.51)	(0.42)	(0.31)	(0.49)
	21-30	-0.05	-0.06	0.34	-0.18	0.09	-0.73	0.24
		(0.31)	(0.41)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.32)	(0.57)	(0.37)
	31+	-0.31	-0.27	0.43**	0.23	0.38	-0.36	0.26
		(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.17)	(0.28)	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Best or highest	3-5	0.24	0.21	-0.64	-0.54	-0.87**	-0.22	-0.52**
		(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.57)	(0.44)	(0.38)	(0.57)	(0.24)
	6-10	0.47	0.59*	-0.71	-0.40	-0.26	-0.55	0.29
		(0.42)	(0.29)	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.40)	(0.53)	(0.39)
	11-15	0.22	0.37	-0.59	-0.60*	-0.51	-1.03***	0.35
		(0.30)	(0.22)	(0.45)	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.27)	(0.35)
	15-20	0.50	0.76**	-0.67	-0.57	-0.54	-1.20***	0.40
		(0.51)	(0.30)	(0.55)	(0.48)	(0.44)	(0.36)	(0.41)
	21-30	0.01	0.25	-0.36	-0.30	-0.18	-0.34	0.18
		(0.34)	(0.22)	(0.61)	(0.54)	(0.41)	(0.54)	(0.46)

31+	0.28	0.26	-0.40	-0.34	-0.33	-0.67	0.34
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.54)	(0.42)	(0.38)	(0.61)	(0.37)

Comments: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered within countries). The table shows the effect of length of stay in destination country on trust (0-2 years is the reference category). For each institutional quality variable, the Swedish expatriates, restricted to those who have lived at least half of their time abroad in the country where they currently are residing, are divided into thirds depending of level of the institutional characteristic and a separate regression model has been estimated. All models include controls for the individual characteristics in Table A1 (see comments to Table A1 for additional information on the variables) and country fixed effects. Source: the SOM Institute's Swedish Expatriate Survey 2014; the Quality of Government standard dataset (January 2017 version).

Table A3. Explaining trust using individual characteristics and length of stay in countries with different institutional quality, divided into tertiles. Estimated levels of trust, OLS regression models with country fixed effects

Tertile	Years in new country	CPI	EFW2	EFW	EFW5	EFW3	EFW1	EFW4
Worst or lowest	0-2	7.27	7.13	7.56	7.77	7.94	7.15	7.22
		(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.37)	(0.13)	(0.37)
	3-5	7.41	7.41	7.12	6.94	8.08	7.41	7.33
		(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.70)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.27)	(0.09)
	6-10	6.72	6.74	7.07	7.45	7.70	7.98	7.34
		(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.19)	(0.36)	(0.09)	(0.16)
	11-15	6.49	6.75	7.31	6.98	7.29	7.52	7.14
		(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.34)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.10)
	15-20	6.85	6.96	6.85	7.59	7.95	7.78	7.36
		(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.38)	(0.29)	(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.24)
	21-30	6.46	6.75	7.15	7.33	7.19	7.64	7.52
		(0.39)	(0.35)	(0.25)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.59)
	31+	6.30	6.52	7.00	6.99	7.17	7.61	6.61
		(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.25)
Medium	0-2	7.67	7.70	7.11	7.25	7.07	7.59	7.03
		(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.15)	(0.26)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.29)
	3-5	7.10	7.38	7.53	7.88	7.62	7.21	7.78
		(0.41)	(0.48)	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.33)	(0.30)
	6-10	7.32	7.50	7.85	7.58	7.55	7.06	7.49
		(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.20)
	11-15	7.04	6.92	7.39	7.41	7.34	7.18	7.17
		(0.24)	(0.31)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.17)
	15-20	6.88	6.59	8.00	7.49	7.50	7.46	7.16
		(0.35)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.10)	(0.28)
	21-30	7.62	7.64	7.44	7.07	7.16	6.86	7.27
		(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.24)	(0.37)	(0.23)
	31+	7.36	7.43	7.54	7.48	7.45	7.23	7.29
		(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Best or highest	0-2	7.38	7.16	7.85	7.77	7.94	7.15	7.22
		(0.31)	(0.22)	(0.46)	(0.21)	(0.37)	(0.13)	(0.37)
	3-5	7.61	7.37	7.21	6.94	8.08	7.41	7.33
		(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.27)	(0.09)
	6-10	7.85	7.75	7.14	7.45	7.70	7.98	7.34
		(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.36)	(0.09)	(0.16)

11-15	7.59 (0.11)	7.53 (0.13)	7.26 (0.18)	6.98 (0.34)	7.29 (0.17)	7.52 (0.17)	7.14 (0.10)
15-20	7.87 (0.23)	7.92 (0.12)	7.17 (0.29)	7.59 (0.29)	7.95 (0.17)	7.78 (0.27)	7.36 (0.24)
21-30	7.38 (0.11)	7.42 (0.12)	7.48 (0.28)	7.33 (0.15)	7.19 (0.17)	7.64 (0.09)	7.52 (0.59)
31+	7.66 (0.12)	7.42 (0.10)	7.44 (0.18)	6.99 (0.12)	7.17 (0.16)	7.61 (0.09)	6.61 (0.25)

Comments: The table is based on the same regressions as presented in Table A2, but this table shows the estimated level of trust at different length of stay in destination country. For each institutional quality variable, the Swedish expatriates, restricted to those who have lived at least half of their time abroad in the country where they currently are residing, are divided into thirds depending of level of the institutional characteristic and a separate regression model has been estimated. All models include controls for the individual characteristics in Table A1 (see comments to Table A1 for additional information on the variables) and country fixed effects. Source: the SOM Institute's Swedish Expatriate Survey 2014; the Quality of Government standard dataset (January 2017 version).

Table A4. Explaining trust using individual characteristics and length of stay in countries with different institutional quality, divided into tertiles. Estimated levels of trust, OLS regression with country fixed effects, restricted models with fewer covariates

Tertile	Years in new country	CPI	EFW2	EFW	EFW5	EFW3	EFW1	EFW4
Worst or lowest	0-2	7.32	7.19	7.59	7.87	7.85	7.06	7.14
		(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.38)	(0.19)	(0.39)
	3-5	7.25	7.32	7.06	6.84	8.01	7.43	7.26
		(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.64)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.26)	(0.12)
	6-10	6.76	6.80	7.18	7.47	7.77	7.98	7.40
		(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.20)	(0.31)	(0.13)	(0.11)
	11-15	6.41	6.71	7.24	6.96	7.39	7.63	7.18
		(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.07)
	15-20	6.77	6.95	6.89	7.62	7.84	7.77	7.30
		(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.34)	(0.26)	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.27)
	21-30	6.74	6.94	7.16	7.32	7.28	7.57	7.74
		(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.53)
	31+	6.37	6.60	7.01	7.04	7.13	7.56	6.71
		(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.20)
Medium	0-2	7.72	7.78	6.98	7.09	6.94	7.58	7.29
		(0.14)	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.29)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.31)
	3-5	7.16	7.30	7.53	7.85	7.64	7.06	7.84
		(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.33)	(0.32)
	6-10	7.41	7.60	7.88	7.57	7.57	7.09	7.48
		(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.19)
	11-15	7.09	6.93	7.50	7.47	7.44	7.12	7.09
		(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.15)
	15-20	6.82	6.49	8.09	7.55	7.46	7.36	7.22
		(0.37)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.26)	(0.21)	(0.09)	(0.27)
	21-30	7.59	7.62	7.47	7.20	7.06	6.90	7.35
		(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.24)	(0.39)	(0.23)
	31+	7.30	7.36	7.47	7.51	7.36	7.31	7.27
		(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Best or highest	0-2	7.20	6.92	7.82	7.86	7.74	7.90	7.27
		(0.31)	(0.26)	(0.44)	(0.35)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.32)
	3-5	7.59	7.34	7.11	7.39	6.77	7.61	6.79
		(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.35)	(0.21)	(0.19)
	6-10	7.84	7.72	7.20	7.49	7.54	7.23	7.63
		(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.20)	(0.29)	(0.13)	(0.19)

11-15	7.64 (0.09)	7.61 (0.13)	7.28 (0.17)	7.22 (0.20)	7.11 (0.19)	6.80 (0.20)	7.72 (0.15)
15-20	7.83 (0.21)	7.89 (0.13)	7.11 (0.27)	7.10 (0.32)	7.15 (0.27)	6.53 (0.24)	7.64 (0.20)
21-30	7.35 (0.13)	7.38 (0.13)	7.36 (0.31)	7.35 (0.32)	7.46 (0.26)	7.44 (0.17)	7.37 (0.25)
31+	7.64 (0.13)	7.51 (0.12)	7.43 (0.13)	7.42 (0.17)	7.37 (0.25)	7.11 (0.22)	7.65 (0.12)

Comments: robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered within countries). The table shows shows the estimated level of trust at different length of stay in destination country. For each institutional quality variable, the Swedish expatriates, restricted to those who have lived at least half of their time abroad in the country where they currently are residing, are divided into thirds depending of level of the institutional characteristic and a separate regression model has been estimated. All models include controls for the following individual characteristics: sex, age, at least one parent who grew up outside of Europe, and moved abroad for a job (see comments to Table A1 for additional information on the variables) and country fixed effects. Source: the SOM Institute's Swedish Expatriate Survey 2014; the Quality of Government standard dataset (January 2017 version).

Table A5. Explaining trust using individual characteristics and length of stay in countries with different institutional quality, divided into tertiles. Estimated levels of trust, OLS regression with country fixed effects, models restricted to only countries with at least 10 Swedish expats

Tertile	Years in new country	CPI	EFW2	EFW	EFW5	EFW3	EFW1	EFW4
Worst or lowest	0-2	7.27 (0.22)	7.13 (0.23)	7.56 (0.22)	7.77 (0.21)	7.94 (0.37)	7.15 (0.13)	7.22 (0.37)
	3-5	7.41 (0.31)	7.41 (0.29)	7.12 (0.70)	6.94 (0.30)	8.08 (0.34)	7.41 (0.27)	7.33 (0.09)
	6-10	6.72 (0.26)	6.74 (0.25)	7.07 (0.30)	7.45 (0.19)	7.70 (0.36)	7.98 (0.09)	7.34 (0.16)
	11-15	6.49 (0.26)	6.75 (0.17)	7.31 (0.24)	6.98 (0.34)	7.29 (0.17)	7.52 (0.17)	7.14 (0.10)
	15-20	6.85 (0.11)	6.96 (0.13)	6.85 (0.38)	7.59 (0.29)	7.95 (0.17)	7.78 (0.27)	7.36 (0.24)
	21-30	6.46 (0.39)	6.75 (0.35)	7.15 (0.25)	7.33 (0.15)	7.19 (0.17)	7.64 (0.09)	7.52 (0.59)
	31+	6.30 (0.17)	6.52 (0.16)	7.00 (0.15)	6.99 (0.12)	7.17 (0.16)	7.61 (0.09)	6.61 (0.25)
Medium	0-2	7.67 (0.21)	7.70 (0.29)	7.11 (0.15)	7.25 (0.26)	7.07 (0.21)	7.59 (0.29)	7.03 (0.29)
	3-5	7.10 (0.41)	7.38 (0.48)	7.53 (0.22)	7.88 (0.16)	7.62 (0.13)	7.21 (0.33)	7.78 (0.30)
	6-10	7.32 (0.17)	7.50 (0.16)	7.85 (0.13)	7.58 (0.08)	7.55 (0.12)	7.06 (0.15)	7.49 (0.20)
	11-15	7.04 (0.24)	6.92 (0.31)	7.39 (0.11)	7.41 (0.06)	7.34 (0.13)	7.18 (0.16)	7.17 (0.17)
	15-20	6.88 (0.35)	6.59 (0.15)	8.00 (0.14)	7.49 (0.29)	7.50 (0.25)	7.46 (0.10)	7.16 (0.28)
	21-30	7.62 (0.15)	7.64 (0.16)	7.44 (0.20)	7.07 (0.13)	7.16 (0.24)	6.86 (0.37)	7.27 (0.23)
	31+	7.36 (0.18)	7.43 (0.14)	7.54 (0.13)	7.48 (0.19)	7.45 (0.16)	7.23 (0.09)	7.29 (0.11)
Best or highest	0-2	7.38 (0.31)	7.16 (0.22)	7.85 (0.46)	7.81 (0.34)	7.69 (0.26)	7.75 (0.42)	7.33 (0.32)
	3-5	7.61 (0.19)	7.37 (0.24)	7.21 (0.26)	7.27 (0.28)	6.82 (0.39)	7.53 (0.20)	6.81 (0.24)
	6-10	7.85	7.75	7.14	7.40	7.43	7.21	7.62

	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.16)	(0.24)
11-15	7.59	7.53	7.26	7.21	7.18	6.72	7.68
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.17)
15-20	7.87	7.92	7.17	7.24	7.15	6.55	7.73
	(0.23)	(0.12)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.20)
21-30	7.38	7.42	7.48	7.51	7.51	7.41	7.51
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.15)	(0.24)
31+	7.66	7.42	7.44	7.47	7.36	7.08	7.67
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.14)

Comments: robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered within countries). The table shows the estimated level of trust at different length of stay in destination country.. For each institutional quality variable, the Swedish expatriates, restricted to those who have lived at least half of their time abroad in the country where they currently are residing, are divided into thirds depending of level of the institutional characteristic and a separate regression model has been estimated. All models include controls for the individual characteristics in Table A1 (see comments to Table A1 for additional information on the variables) and country fixed effects. The models are equivalent to the models presented in Table A2, but with the difference that they only include destination countries with at least 10 Swedish expatriates. Source: the SOM Institute's Swedish Expatriate Survey 2014; the Quality of Government standard dataset (January 2017 version).

Table A6. Explaining trust using individual characteristics and length of stay in countries with different institutional quality, divided into tertiles. Estimated levels of trust, OLS regression models without country fixed effects

Tertile	Years in new country	CPI	EFW2	EFW	EFW5	EFW3	EFW1	EFW4
Worst or lowest	0-2	7.17	7.13	7.16	7.38	6.76	7.19	7.11
		(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.43)	(0.16)	(0.22)
	3-5	7.06	7.35	6.89	7.05	7.35	7.44	7.29
		(0.31)	(0.24)	(0.54)	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.17)
	6-10	6.71	6.67	6.76	7.45	6.86	7.96	7.31
		(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.30)
	11-15	6.51	6.78	7.06	6.65	7.31	7.44	7.23
		(0.29)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.11)
	15-20	6.83	6.86	6.59	7.33	7.89	7.81	7.36
		(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.37)	(0.42)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.34)
	21-30	6.62	6.81	7.16	7.48	7.26	7.54	7.00
		(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.58)
	31+	6.46	6.60	7.32	7.09	7.47	7.67	6.89
		(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.18)	(0.24)
Medium	0-2	7.32	7.48	7.09	7.06	7.18	7.13	7.13
		(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.29)	(0.26)
	3-5	7.11	7.31	7.53	7.70	7.58	7.24	7.73
		(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.13)	(0.43)	(0.34)
	6-10	7.30	7.40	7.85	7.59	7.62	7.27	7.45
		(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.15)
	11-15	7.09	6.91	7.24	7.35	7.23	7.14	6.98
		(0.20)	(0.30)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.21)
	15-20	7.00	6.51	7.93	7.49	7.37	7.44	7.14
		(0.46)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.42)
	21-30	7.65	7.52	7.54	7.07	7.31	6.95	7.38
		(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.30)	(0.36)	(0.18)
	31+	7.39	7.64	7.71	7.87	7.46	7.24	7.35
		(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.33)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.21)
Best or highest	0-2	7.46	7.32	7.61	7.76	7.52	7.57	7.70
		(0.31)	(0.24)	(0.45)	(0.35)	(0.22)	(0.42)	(0.25)
	3-5	7.62	7.44	7.05	7.27	6.99	7.38	6.90
		(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.42)	(0.20)	(0.26)
	6-10	7.91	7.77	7.18	7.45	7.35	7.06	7.65
		(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.30)	(0.25)	(0.16)	(0.43)

11-15	7.55 (0.16)	7.39 (0.12)	7.29 (0.20)	7.14 (0.25)	7.08 (0.19)	6.75 (0.25)	7.46 (0.25)
15-20	7.83 (0.30)	7.90 (0.21)	7.30 (0.34)	7.33 (0.42)	7.23 (0.40)	6.57 (0.10)	7.68 (0.26)
21-30	7.30 (0.17)	7.37 (0.17)	7.43 (0.25)	7.45 (0.25)	7.49 (0.17)	7.44 (0.22)	7.49 (0.23)
31+	7.66 (0.13)	7.55 (0.07)	7.39 (0.12)	7.49 (0.13)	7.46 (0.08)	7.23 (0.26)	7.76 (0.14)

Comments: robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered within countries). The table shows shows the estimated level of trust at different length of stay in destination country.. For each institutional quality variable, the Swedish expatriates, restricted to those who have lived at least half of their time abroad in the country where they currently are residing, are divided into thirds depending of level of the institutional characteristic and a separate regression model has been estimated. All models include controls for the individual characteristics in Table A1 (see comments to Table A1 for additional information on the variables). Source: the SOM Institute's Swedish Expatriate Survey 2014; the Quality of Government standard dataset (January 2017 version).

Table A7. Explaining trust using individual characteristics and length of stay in countries with different institutional quality, divided into tertiles. Coefficients from OLS regression models with control for Gini and without country fixed effects

Tertile	Years in new country	CPI	EFW2	EFW	EFW5	EFW3	EFW1	EFW4
Worst or lowest	0-2	7.17	7.15	7.28	7.64	7.38	7.24	7.22
		(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.54)	(0.23)	(0.28)
	3-5	7.04	7.38	7.11	7.05	7.98	7.42	7.27
		(0.33)	(0.24)	(0.63)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.14)
	6-10	6.66	6.67	6.92	7.49	7.34	7.99	7.27
		(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.31)	(0.24)	(0.31)	(0.18)	(0.22)
	11-15	6.58	6.76	7.16	7.00	7.38	7.45	7.16
		(0.29)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.10)
	15-20	6.83	6.87	6.72	7.50	7.90	7.76	7.41
		(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.16)	(0.30)	(0.22)
	21-30	6.60	6.80	7.06	7.36	7.13	7.53	7.24
		(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.54)
	31+	6.46	6.56	7.20	7.04	7.37	7.67	6.86
		(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.17)	(0.20)
Medium	0-2	7.36	7.50	7.12	7.12	7.15	7.17	7.19
		(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.32)	(0.29)
	3-5	7.16	7.32	7.54	7.76	7.56	7.21	7.79
		(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.11)	(0.40)	(0.33)
	6-10	7.29	7.42	7.86	7.58	7.59	7.19	7.47
		(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.15)
	11-15	7.09	6.94	7.28	7.36	7.26	7.17	7.09
		(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.18)
	15-20	6.99	6.54	7.93	7.45	7.40	7.48	7.14
		(0.41)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.19)	(0.27)
	21-30	7.65	7.60	7.52	7.04	7.33	6.97	7.19
		(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.17)
	31+	7.43	7.64	7.70	7.83	7.48	7.27	7.32
		(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.32)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Best or highest	0-2	7.44	7.16	7.78	7.71	7.51	7.77	7.76
		(0.35)	(0.28)	(0.45)	(0.33)	(0.23)	(0.41)	(0.25)
	3-5	7.60	7.37	7.13	7.25	6.94	7.46	6.95
		(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.40)	(0.21)	(0.20)
	6-10	7.87	7.74	7.16	7.42	7.34	7.10	7.67
		(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.37)

11-15	7.55 (0.13)	7.49 (0.14)	7.26 (0.16)	7.17 (0.23)	7.12 (0.13)	6.79 (0.21)	7.50 (0.27)
15-20	7.87 (0.26)	7.95 (0.17)	7.27 (0.30)	7.33 (0.36)	7.21 (0.30)	6.56 (0.12)	7.66 (0.23)
21-30	7.32 (0.13)	7.38 (0.15)	7.44 (0.29)	7.45 (0.30)	7.49 (0.29)	7.42 (0.26)	7.51 (0.26)
31+	7.67 (0.16)	7.52 (0.12)	7.46 (0.13)	7.51 (0.18)	7.47 (0.18)	7.19 (0.27)	7.80 (0.13)

Comments: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered within countries). The table shows the effect of length of stay in destination country on trust (0-2 years is the reference category). For each institutional quality variable, the Swedish expatriates, restricted to those who have lived at least half of their time abroad in the country where they currently are residing, are divided into thirds depending of level of the institutional characteristic and a separate regression model has been estimated. All models include controls for the individual characteristics in Table A1 (see comments to Table A1 for additional information on the variables) and the Gini coefficient. Gini is retrieved from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), version 4.0. Source: the SOM Institute's Swedish Expatriate Survey 2014; the Quality of Government standard dataset (January 2017 version).

Table A8a. Individual characteristics by different level of corruption and length of stay in new country (0–5 years vs 20+ years), among Swedish expats.

Individual characteristics	<u>Worst countries</u>				<u>Best countries</u>			
	<u>0-5 years</u>		<u>20+ years</u>		<u>0-5 years</u>		<u>20+ years</u>	
	Mean	s.e.	Mean	s.e.	Mean	s.e.	Mean	s.e.
Age	52.52	1.52	59.68	0.95	34.02	1.08	56.80	0.88
Female	0.42	0.05	0.59	0.05	0.65	0.05	0.63	0.03
Non-European Parent	0.14	0.02	0.21	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01
High education	0.63	0.05	0.56	0.05	0.71	0.04	0.63	0.03
Migrated for job	0.23	0.04	0.24	0.04	0.52	0.05	0.29	0.03
Religious	0.31	0.05	0.49	0.05	0.25	0.04	0.39	0.04
Married	0.86	0.03	0.75	0.04	0.73	0.04	0.85	0.03
Employed	0.39	0.05	0.50	0.05	0.81	0.04	0.60	0.04
Unemployed	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01
Retired	0.41	0.05	0.40	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.33	0.03
Health	8.32	0.17	7.98	0.21	8.28	0.15	8.23	0.13
Observations	175		203		138		254	

Table A8b. Individual characteristics of Swedish expats, by different level of corruption and age upon arrival (–30 years vs 30+ years) to their new country.

Individual characteristics	<u>Worst countries</u>				<u>Best countries</u>			
	<u>–30 years</u>		<u>30+ years</u>		<u>–30 years</u>		<u>30+ years</u>	
	Mean	s.e.	Mean	s.e.	Mean	s.e.	Mean	s.e.
Age	46.58	1.33	58.40	0.76	41.41	0.75	53.80	0.87
Female	0.59	0.04	0.41	0.04	0.63	0.03	0.48	0.04
Non-European Parent	0.20	0.03	0.17	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.01
High education	0.60	0.04	0.63	0.03	0.70	0.02	0.66	0.03
Migrated for job	0.25	0.04	0.30	0.03	0.38	0.03	0.55	0.04
Religious	0.53	0.04	0.40	0.03	0.32	0.03	0.36	0.03
Married	0.74	0.04	0.85	0.02	0.79	0.02	0.77	0.03
Employed	0.64	0.04	0.42	0.03	0.75	0.02	0.69	0.03
Unemployed	0.08	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01
Retired	0.19	0.04	0.45	0.04	0.09	0.02	0.26	0.03
Health	8.13	0.17	8.07	0.12	8.26	0.09	8.17	0.13
Observations	254		415		424		250	

Comment: Weighted estimates. The Swedish expatriates, restricted to those who have lived at least half of their time abroad in the country where they currently are residing, are divided into thirds depending of level of corruption, as measured in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, in the country they are currently residing in. For additional information about the individual characteristics, see Table 3 in the paper.

Table A9. Average trust (unconditional and conditional on individual characteristics) among recent migrants to countries with different institutional quality

Institutional quality	Corruption				Rule of law			
	Intention to move		No intention to move		Intention to move		No intention to move	
	Uncond.	Cond.	Uncond.	Cond.	Uncond.	Cond.	Uncond.	Cond.
Worst	6.84	6.68	7.48	7.82	7.37	7.51	7.27	7.64
	(0.28)	(0.35)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.32)	(0.24)	(0.33)
Medium	6.89	7.39	6.94	7.34	6.69	7.00	7.22	7.68
	(0.32)	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.24)
Best	7.47	7.75	6.92	7.15	7.50	7.49	6.71	6.92
	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.43)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.38)	(0.44)
Observations	203	186	207	187	200	183	202	182

Comment: The estimates refer to the average trust among Swedish expatriates, restricted to those who have lived at least half of their time abroad in the country where they currently are residing and who have lived there no longer than five years, divided into thirds depending of their new country's institutional characteristics and intention to move. The intention to move is based on answers to the survey question "Do you think you will still be living in [country] in five years?" Those respondent who answered "yes, certainly" or "yes, probably" are defined as having no intention to move, all other are defined as having an intention to move (including those who answered "don't know"). Standard errors are presented within parentheses. Corruption is based on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index and. Rule of law refers to Fraser Institute's Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights Index. The estimates conditional on individual characteristics include all covariates in Table 3 and also a variable referring to if the reason for migrating was work. Source: the SOM Institute's Swedish Expatriate Survey 2014; the Quality of Government standard dataset, January 2017 version (Teorell et al. 2016).

Table A10. Explaining trust using individual characteristics and length of stay in countries with different institutional quality, divided into tertiles. Estimated levels of trust, OLS regression with country fixed effects, restricted model with retirees excluded.

Tertile	Years in new country	CPI	EFW2	EFW	EFW5	EFW3	EFW1	EFW4
Worst or lowest	0-5	7.07	7.18	7.07	6.87	7.91	7.19	7.20
		(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.37)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.18)	(0.18)
	6-20	6.78	6.93	6.89	7.32	7.69	7.75	7.33
		(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)
	21+	6.24	6.66	6.95	7.10	6.89	7.56	6.64
		(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.34)
Medium	0-5	7.28	7.25	7.16	7.50	7.38	7.29	7.35
		(0.17)	(0.29)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.28)
	6-20	7.02	6.96	7.77	7.47	7.46	7.26	7.21
		(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.13)
	21+	7.59	7.47	7.47	7.34	7.38	7.07	7.35
		(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.20)
Best or highest	0-5	7.43	7.19	7.46	6.87	7.91	7.19	7.20
		(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.18)	(0.18)
	6-20	7.74	7.72	7.18	7.32	7.69	7.75	7.33
		(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)
	21+	7.37	7.37	7.44	7.10	6.89	7.56	6.64
		(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.24)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.34)

Comments: robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered within countries). The table shows shows the estimated level of trust at different length of stay in destination country. For each institutional quality variable, the Swedish expatriates, restricted to those who have lived at least half of their time abroad in the country where they currently are residing, are divided into thirds depending of level of the institutional characteristic and a separate regression model has been estimated. All models include controls for the following individual characteristics: sex, age, at least one parent who grew up outside of Europe, and moved abroad for a job (see comments to Table A1 for additional information on the variables) and country fixed effects. Source: the SOM Institute's Swedish Expatriate Survey 2014; the Quality of Government standard dataset (January 2017 version).

Table A11. Explaining trust using individual characteristics and length of stay in countries with different institutional quality, divided into tertiles. Estimated levels of trust, OLS regression with country fixed effects, restricted model with respondents age 60+ excluded.

Tertile	Years in new country	CPI	EFW2	EFW	EFW5	EFW3	EFW1	EFW4
Worst or lowest	0-5	7.10	7.19	6.89	6.79	7.75	7.19	7.16
		(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.38)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.18)	(0.20)
	6-20	6.63	6.80	6.78	7.39	7.47	7.77	7.25
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.12)
	21+	6.04	6.57	6.53	6.95	6.58	7.39	6.89
		(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.28)
Medium	0-5	7.26	7.29	7.14	7.44	7.38	7.33	7.34
		(0.17)	(0.29)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.29)
	6-20	7.05	6.89	7.76	7.44	7.49	7.25	7.18
		(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.13)
	21+	7.49	7.29	7.46	7.22	7.26	6.90	7.20
		(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.24)
Best or highest	0-5	7.39	7.20	7.49	6.79	7.75	7.19	7.16
		(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.18)	(0.20)
	6-20	7.72	7.74	7.16	7.39	7.47	7.77	7.25
		(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.12)
	21+	7.25	7.25	7.38	6.95	6.58	7.39	6.89
		(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.23)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.28)

Comments: robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered within countries). The table shows shows the estimated level of trust at different length of stay in destination country. For each institutional quality variable, the Swedish expatriates, restricted to those who have lived at least half of their time abroad in the country where they currently are residing, are divided into thirds depending of level of the institutional characteristic and a separate regression model has been estimated. All models include controls for the following individual characteristics: sex, age, at least one parent who grew up outside of Europe, and moved abroad for a job (see comments to Table A1 for additional information on the variables) and country fixed effects. Source: the SOM Institute's Swedish Expatriate Survey 2014; the Quality of Government standard dataset (January 2017 version).

Table A12. Explaining trust using individual characteristics and length of stay in countries with different institutional quality, divided into tertiles. Estimated levels of trust, OLS regression with country fixed effects, restricted model with residents in Thailand excluded.

Tertile	Years in new country	CPI	EFW2	EFW	EFW5	EFW3	EFW1	EFW4
Worst or lowest	0-5	7.34	7.25	7.40	7.26	8.09	7.27	7.28
		(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.37)	(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.15)	(0.16)
	6-20	6.69	6.82	7.09	7.41	7.66	7.77	7.31
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
	21+	6.43	6.69	7.11	7.17	7.26	7.62	6.87
		(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.16)
Medium	0-5	7.33	7.48	7.35	7.56	7.40	7.40	7.47
		(0.19)	(0.29)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.25)
	6-20	7.10	7.10	7.75	7.51	7.47	7.21	7.26
		(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)
	21+	7.50	7.53	7.47	7.30	7.31	7.08	7.29
		(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Best or highest	0-5	7.52	7.30	7.46	7.26	8.09	7.27	7.28
		(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.15)	(0.16)
	6-20	7.79	7.73	7.19	7.41	7.66	7.77	7.31
		(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
	21+	7.53	7.41	7.47	7.17	7.26	7.62	6.87
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.23)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.16)

Comments: robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered within countries). The table shows shows the estimated level of trust at different length of stay in destination country. For each institutional quality variable, the Swedish expatriates, restricted to those who have lived at least half of their time abroad in the country where they currently are residing, are divided into thirds depending of level of the institutional characteristic and a separate regression model has been estimated. All models include controls for the following individual characteristics: sex, age, at least one parent who grew up outside of Europe, and moved abroad for a job (see comments to Table A1 for additional information on the variables) and country fixed effects. Source: the SOM Institute's Swedish Expatriate Survey 2014; the Quality of Government standard dataset (January 2017 version).

Figure A1. The effect on trust of length of stay in countries with different levels of corruption, with and without control for Gini (no fixed effects)




Figure A2. Sample divided into respondents with and without regular contact with authorities




Figure A3. The effect of length of stay in destination countries with different institutional quality on social trust




Figure A4. Trust and length of stay in destination countries with different institutional quality (model with sample splits, retirees excluded).




Figure A5. Trust and length of stay in destination countries with different institutional quality (model with sample splits, age 60 or older excluded).




Figure A6. Trust and length of stay in destination countries with different institutional quality (model with sample splits, expats in Thailand excluded).

