The conference brought together researchers in corporate finance and labor economics to examine the interaction between firms and human capital. Across the sessions, the contributions addressed how firms shape workers’ careers, how institutions influence incentives to invest in employees, and how technological and organizational change affects labor markets. All presentations were based on ongoing research, and the findings may therefore be revised.
The first session focused on how institutions, contracts, and corporate governance shape workers’ careers and firms’ investments in human capital. Marco Pagano (University of Naples Federico II) presented evidence that workers benefit when a relative becomes the CEO or controlling owner of a firm, particularly in family firms where employment and income gains are concentrated within the family-controlled company. Related questions about incentives and labor supply were addressed by Ramin Baghai (Stockholm School of Economics), who showed that wage garnishment reduces labor supply among indebted workers and negatively affects firm sales and value added, especially in smaller firms. Andrea Ichino (University of Bologna) examined how family-policy reforms can help couples communicate preferences over childcare and careers, potentially improving labor-market outcomes.
The session also highlighted the role of employment contracts in firms’ human-capital strategies. Merih Sevilir (ESMT Berlin) showed that firms increase investments in human capital when non-compete agreements become less enforceable, while Jessica Jeffers (HEC Paris), drawing on nearly 6,000 U.S. court cases, documented the types of knowledge and relationships firms seek to protect through such agreements. Together, these studies illustrated how legal and institutional arrangements can affect both workers’ incentives and firms’ willingness to invest in employees.
The second session examined how workers are matched to firms and how mobility and changes in ownership affect careers and organizations. Oskar Nordström Skans (Uppsala University) presented evidence that workers sort across firms according to comparative advantage and that the value of particular skills depends on firms’ production environments. Andrea Weber (Central European University) studied mobility between Austria and Germany, documenting substantial wage gains from migration and showing that international experience continues to be rewarded when workers return home.
Mobility within and across firms was complemented by studies of organizational change and firm-specific wage setting. Ernst Maug (University of Mannheim) examined how firms restructure their workforces following acquisitions and how changes in ownership and control affect organizational structure. Andreas Kostøl (BI Norwegian Business School) showed that firm-specific wage premiums influence not only workers’ earnings but also household consumption, implying that differences in pay across firms translate into differences in living standards and consumption inequality. Taken together, the contributions emphasized that firms play an important role in determining both the allocation of workers and the economic returns they receive.
The third session turned to technological change, entrepreneurship, ownership, and taxation. Elena Simintzi (UNC Kenan-Flagler Business School) presented evidence that startups more exposed to generative AI tend to reduce employment while increasing productivity per employee. Horng Chern Wong (Stockholm University) showed that technological change favoring highly educated workers is concentrated primarily among large firms, contributing to widening differences between high- and low-skilled workers. These studies highlighted how technological change can alter both firm organization and the distribution of labor-market opportunities.
Other contributions examined how institutions and ownership structures shape entrepreneurship and talent allocation. Spyridon Lagaras (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign) showed that Brazil’s Bolsa Família cash-transfer program increases business creation, although the resulting firms tend to grow more slowly and have lower survival rates. Margarita Tsoutsoura (Washington University in St. Louis) presented evidence that family firms hire individuals with lower measured talent and education than comparable firms, particularly in senior positions, suggesting that nepotism can affect the allocation of talent. Gabriella Massenz (IFN) concluded the session by showing how progressive corporate taxation can create incentives for firms to divide their activities across multiple legal entities, making organizational structure an important margin of adjustment to corporate taxation.
Taken together, the conference highlighted the central role of firms in creating, developing, and allocating human capital. The contributions showed how organizational structures, ownership, technological change, and institutions shape productivity, career opportunities, and economic mobility. Firms are not merely places where work is performed, but also environments in which human capital is developed, valued, and reallocated, with important consequences for individuals and the broader economy.